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       The separation of powers proves to be an integral tenet of any liberal-democratic society. This 
notion asserts that the political executive, legislature(s), and judiciary of a nation should operate 
independent of one another in order to prevent the disproportionate concentration of power 
amongst a singular group in society. In most cases, the role of crafting public policy falls upon the 
legislature in those nations that subscribe to such principles, which is itself usually comprised of 
the peoples’ elected representatives. While Canada has long held itself to be a liberal-democratic 
society, with respect for all that such a political philosophy entails, the entrenchment of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 saw the judiciary impede the legislature’s sole 
right to pass legislation through its being explicitly instructed to conduct judicial review. 
Effectively, the Supreme Court of Canada has since been able to modify, and in some cases 
outright strike down, laws that have been passed by the legislature(s). 
 
       While many have objected to this development on the basis that it seems to run counter to the 
separation of powers principle, it remains a fact that such action is justifiable under the Canadian 
constitution (Leishman 2003, 73). Rather, the more pertinent issue becomes not one of normative 
judgment, but of descriptive assessment; namely, whether or not the courts are well-equipped to 
make effective policy regardless of the contention inherent in their doing so. To this end, the factors 
that inform the creation of good policy must themselves be considered, so that an analysis may be 
facilitated with respect to whether the judiciary satisfies such criteria or not. Following such an 
assessment it begs to be asked whether the present system, with its strong emphasis on judicial 
review, is misguided in regard to its faith in the courts’ policy-making capabilities, or justified in 
such.  
 
       While a great many tend to agree that judicial review is a useful means of eliciting meaning 
from vague policy, such a recognition does not itself constitute an acquiescence of judicial 
supremacy over the legislature(s) (MacKay 2001, 37). As a result, the degree to which judicial 
review should be employed in conjuncture with the legislature(s) in crafting policy must too be 
considered. Specifically, the manner through which the judiciary and the legislature(s) themselves 
engage in dialogue must be examined, so as to ascertain whether any particular model of said 
dialogue proves more favorable in its implications both pragmatically and in principle. This paper 
will endeavor to examine those factors that have been mentioned in order to holistically assess the 
judiciary’s effectiveness in its role as a policy-maker, and whether or not an alternative means of 
assessing Charter compliance is subsequently warranted.       
   
       In order to properly assess the effectiveness of courts as public policy-makers, the subject of 
good policy itself must first be elucidated upon. To this end, the subject of such elucidation must 
first be clearly understood, so as to easily facilitate the essential judgments of virtue that 
necessarily follow. Accordingly, the breadth of scope inherent in public policy as a concept must 
be narrowed in some way so as to enable a relatively general description of such to be clearly 
asserted. For the purposes of this paper, public policy will be examined with respect to its being 
the operationalization of laws within Canadian society; namely, public policy should be 
understood as being the means through which government – irrespective of the specific branches 
defined in the separation of powers – legitimizes its authority to rule through the passing of legally 
binding doctrine, or the implementation of some plan pursuant to such (Kirby, Kroeker, and 
Teschke 1978, 408). Integral to this understanding of public policy is its twofold nature; being that 
it is comprised of both the normative prescription of law in abstract, therefore begging the question 
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 of what ought to be made into law, and the descriptive means through which such law is practically 
implemented and interpreted, therefore begging the question of what written law effectively is in 
respect to its interpretation (and how this interpretation should in turn be employed). This duality 
in nature has allowed for a distinction to be noted in regard to the meritorious judgments made 
about public policy in general (Kirby, Kroeker, and Teschke 1978, 408). Specifically, the means 
through which public policy is evaluated can be sorted into two distinguished groups: those that 
are normative in their nature, and those that are descriptive. Both will be considered to the extent 
that they have bearing on the matter of courts as effective policy-makers. 
 
       The matter of evaluating policy on normative grounds proves to be difficult due to the 
subjectivity inherent in such judgments. There exists little consensus as to what constitutes an 
objectively moral law, for the reason being that the concepts fundamental to such are intangible, 
and wholly abstract in their nature; philosophers and ethicists may debate the merit of laws on 
these abstract grounds, but their arguments are largely rooted in predilection and political-
philosophical orientation, as opposed to empiricism (Leishman 2003, 73). This is not to say that 
such opinions should not be considered here, but rather that the contention inherent in such 
numerous evaluations would necessitate an entirely separate essay in order to properly assess their 
content. For the purposes of this paper, normative judgments of public policy will be considered 
with only general mention of their content, but with specific attention paid to their structural 
sentiment; namely, the measure by which policy ought to be considered objectively correct will be 
addressed, as opposed to the inherent virtues of such policy itself in full.  
 
       While the jury is proverbially out on the matter of what particularly constitutes an objectively 
moral law, notable opinions exist as to how such a matter may be decided upon (Leishman 2003, 
73). Primarily, the concept of democracy itself acknowledges the inherent conflict in issues of 
abstraction, and definitively states that such matters should be resolved through popular vote of 
some kind; basically, the righteousness of a policy ought to be measured with respect to how many 
people are in favor of it (Flynn 2011, 237). Conversely, philosophical universalists believe that the 
righteousness of any law is inherent within it and remains as such regardless of popular opinion 
(MacKay 2001, 37). This is where the aforementioned matter of contention becomes too broad to 
consider, given that there exists a plethora of such universalists who prescribe their own rational 
tests to ascertain the virtue of any given law. In typifying such a demographic, it can be said that 
regardless of their subjective persuasions they all believe the righteousness of a law to be based on 
its qualification of some rational criteria as opposed to, say, popular vote (MacKay 2001, 37). 
 
       While evaluating policy on normative grounds proves to be - as demonstrated - justifiably 
difficult, there exists much more consensus when judging laws on a descriptive basis. This proves 
to be the case due to the element of subjectivity being replaced with one of objective empiricism; 
regardless of a policy’s abstract intent, whether or not it succeeded in its practical purpose can 
seldom be debated with such zeal as can ideas (Kirby, Kroeker, and Teschke 1978, 411). Within 
this realm of evaluation, a policy can be considered good (or at least well crafted) if it satisfies 
such criteria as being cost efficient, or practically employable; for this reason, institutions that 
prove to be efficient policy-makers draw upon such things as knowledge pertaining to matters of 
finance, or the machinery of government available to them in their policy-making endeavors, in 
order to succeed (Kirby, Kroeker, and Teschke 1978, 412). Given that policy obviously has no 
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 effect unless it is actually implemented, knowledge of the means that facilitate such 
implementation is wholly integral to a policy being descriptively evaluated as good.   
              
       In being cognizant of the means through which public policy is properly evaluated, one 
becomes better equipped to apply such evaluative criteria to the judiciary in their capacity as 
creators of such policy. In keeping with the structure outlined previously in this piece, the 
evaluation of courts as policy-makers will be considered with respect to both normative and 
descriptive judgments. Namely, the normative indicators of a policy’s virtue as outlined prior will 
be applied to the matter of judicial review as a means through which to make policy, so as to 
qualify on a normative basis the aptitude of courts as policy-makers. Subsequently, the descriptive 
criteria listed as being sufficient measures of a policy’s material integrity will be applied to the 
context of judicial review as a means through which public policy is produced, so that the aptitude 
of courts as policy-makers may be evaluated in a tangible sense as well.  
 
       With respect to the normative measures of a policy’s goodness, the judiciary is seen as being 
either wholly appropriate, or wholly inappropriate in its role as a policy-making institution 
(Leishman 2003, 73). Recall that the normative measure for evaluating good policy lies within the 
apparent appropriateness of its method of being decided upon in the first place; this is to say that 
democrats – not to be conflated here as being an epithet of the Democratic Party of the United 
States of America, but rather as a moniker for one who subscribes to democracy in principle – 
believe a policy ought to be considered good if it is agreed upon by a majority of individuals in a 
given population. Conversely, universalists subscribe to the belief that any given policy’s goodness 
can only be derived through the use of ethics, or reason (MacKay 2001, 37). Given this, some 
argue that the judiciary is acting irresponsibly in its creation of policy, due in large part to the 
reason that judges are not held to an elected mandate, while members of the legislature(s) are 
(Leishman 2003, 73). Specifically, proponents of democracy argue that judges cannot create good 
policy due to their not being representative of the majority’s opinion; as this proves to be the 
primary normative criterion for such individuals in evaluating policy, they largely maintain that 
judges are not good policy-makers on a normative basis (Leishman 2003, 73).  
 
       Similarly, universalists have the capacity to individually view courts as being either an 
excellent or terrible means through which to create policy as well, depending largely on the 
subjective beliefs of the given individual at hand (MacKay 2001, 37). However, disagreement 
amongst various universalists as to the role of the judiciary in making policy pertains largely to 
whatever specific decisions are made by the courts, and less to the processes through which such 
decisions were reached. Basically, universalists may criticize a court’s role in making policy when 
they dislike a specific ruling (and its implications on policy), but this criticism has more to do with 
the employment of reason or law by the courts themselves, and not with their capacity to actually 
affect policy through their rulings (MacKay 2001, 37). This is to say that, from a universalist 
perspective, if all judges employed reason as they deemed proper, there would be nothing wrong 
with their making policy, as it would be inherently good. Subsequently, they agree in principle 
with the notion of judicial review as a policy-making tool on a normative basis (MacKay 2001, 
37).   
 
       On a descriptive basis however, the matter of judicial capacity to make policy becomes 
notably less contestable. While judges oftentimes have an extremely sophisticated knowledge 
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 regarding matters of law, this same level of knowledge is not readily apparent in their consideration 
of factors beyond the legal discipline (Hiebert 2012, 89). This is not to say that it is inconceivable 
that a given judge possess knowledge of economics, or science, but rather that it cannot be taken 
for granted that they do in fact possess such knowledge, either. Simply put, while a detached 
position from which to rule on matters of law is useful insofar as it pertains to matters of law, it 
does little to aid in the creation of policy which must account for those things that are not abstract 
or purely legal in their nature (Hiebert 2012, 94). Due to the inability of judges to play an active 
role in the execution of their policy, and a general lack of expertise in dealing with the machinery 
of government through which policy is implemented, courts generally are seen as being deficient 
in satisfying the material criteria deemed as being necessary to formulate sound policy (Hiebert 
2004, 1967).   
 
       Having considered the applicability of such normative and descriptive criteria (each being 
necessary to engender good policy in their respective contexts) to the case of judicial review as a 
policy-making tool, it must be ascertained whether or not the degree to which judicial review is 
applied in Canada presently is justified through the application of such evidence. As has been the 
case throughout this paper, such an evaluation will consist of both a normative and descriptive 
analysis, conducted in succession of one another. Given that such analyses are bound to call into 
question the proper means through which policy should be produced, the judiciary will be 
juxtaposed with the legislature(s) in both cases, so that some discernible solution may be derived 
from the pursuant discourse - and itself in turn made available for examination.     
 
       Given the ambiguity inherent in the evaluation of judicial policy-making on normative 
grounds, the matter as to whether or not such action is justifiable becomes equally difficult to 
ascertain. However, on a practical basis, common normative arguments can be fielded still to 
garner the juxtaposition that is necessary to compare the policy-making capabilities of the judiciary 
to the legislature(s). There exists three primary varieties of normative critique that are frequently 
levied against courts in their capacity as policy-makers; these regard the undemocratic nature of 
courts, the subjectivity of their rulings, and the constitutional mandate for them to affect policy 
whatsoever (MacKay 2001, 37). All three will be considered here, in turn. 
 
       First, arguments of a democratic nature will be examined. Simply put – and in line with what 
has been listed prior in this piece – there exists a belief that the judiciary is an undemocratic 
institution, unfit to make policy due to its being appointed and not elected (Leishman 2003, 73). 
Conversely, the legislature in either case is an elected body, and so from a democratic perspective 
(with respect to the criteria listed earlier), it proves more fitting to make policy than do judges 
(Leishman 2003, 73). Yet simultaneously, there also exists proponents of judicial policy-making 
within this same democratic framework. Some maintain, for example, that democracy is a system 
of governance that relies upon the protection of minority rights in order to function; simply, that 
democracy is not synonymous with simple majority rule, but rather exists as a paradigm through 
which voting can only be safely exercised should basic rights be protected regardless of such 
(MacKay 2001, 37). As a result, judicial review as a policy-making tool is justified under such 
belief, being necessary to protect minority rights regardless of the majority opinion - and thus 
facilitating the democratic paradigm’s continued existence. Also interesting to note is that the 
legislature, while being an elected body, does not itself conceive of most of the legislation that it 
is theoretically tasked with creating. Rather, the largely unelected political executive is responsible 
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 for drafting legislation, which is then passed through the legislature for approval - even then, not 
all policy must be granted the legislature's approval anyhow (MacKay 2001, 37). So even if one 
does conceive of democracy as being simple majority rule, the mere dismissal of judicial review 
does nothing to remedy the legislature's’ failure to satisfy this very same normative criterion in 
either case.    
 
       With respect to arguments regarding the subjective nature of judicial rulings, it is commonly 
maintained that there is no mathematical precision with which judges analyze policy (Leishman 
2003, 73). Basically, that even if policy should be subject to review outside of a simple democratic 
framework, that there is no guarantee that judges will make the correct decision anyhow. This can 
be evidenced through the simple admittance of fact that judicial rulings are often overturned due 
to judges utilizing uniform methods to scrutinize law, but in different ways (Leishman 2003, 73). 
That being said, there exists no guarantee that the legislature(s) would prove more effective in this 
scenario themselves, being that the issue at hand is not one of the individuals evaluating law, but 
of the ambiguity of law itself (Hiebert 2012, 95). It should also be mentioned that a great many of 
the critiques within this section fall under the purview of the universalist position listed prior in 
this paper; namely, that the criticism begins and ends with the decision itself and not the method 
through which it was reached (MacKay 2001, 37).  
 
       In regard to the constitutionality of the courts’ role in policy-making, some maintain that the 
judiciary has utilized judicial review as a pretense upon which to increase their own power; 
namely, that they have interpreted their permission to interpret the constitution itself as being 
justification for their policy-making role, when it may not in actuality have been intended as such 
(Hiebert 2004, 1967). The problem with this critique has been echoed in the section prior, being 
that it boils down to a matter of subjective interpretation of the constitution itself. While admittedly 
heavily influenced by the judiciary, it would be beyond the scope of this paper to fully address 
such a complex issue here. Rather, this critique illustrates the importance of fairly interpreting the 
constitution as a means through which to assess all subordinate policy; given this significance, 
there likely should be some consensus as to how such interpretation is undertaken.     
 
       With regard to the descriptive evaluation listed earlier, the matter again becomes more 
straightforward. The mechanical criteria listed as being necessary to create good policy will be 
examined with respect to the ways in which both the judiciary and the legislature(s) address them. 
Quite simply, the consideration of these factors is engendered by knowledge of them in the first 
place and so the capacity of either institution to possess such knowledge will be examined 
specifically (Kirby, Kroeker, and Teschke 1978, 412). This renders the matter rather simple, as the 
probability of the judiciary’s collective knowledge on all matters relevant to the practical processes 
of policy-making exceeding that of the legislatures’ is highly unlikely. Through their reciprocal 
relationship with the civil service, diversity in membership, and through sheer numbers alone, the 
legislatures prove themselves more informed regarding matters of policy formulation than the 
judiciary by virtue of their necessarily concerning themselves with more than written law itself 
(Flynn 2011, 238).  
 
       Additionally, while it is true that judges may account for a great many of the things that go 
into formulating descriptively sound policy in their rulings, there is no guarantee that they will 
consider them to an extent that is greater than that of the legislature(s) (Hiebert 2012, 97). Simply 
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 put, a judge is no better equipped to assess the practical implications of his/her ruling on the field 
of, for example, monetary policy than is the collective body of a legislature that has practical 
experience pertaining to the matter at hand. This is to say that while the courts may be 
constitutionally permitted to make public policy through their second-order duty to conduct 
judicial review, it is not then correct to assume that they are well-suited for such a task in turn 
(Roach 2006, 350). That judges are not required to have extensive knowledge of economics, social 
science, medicine, or any other such field, serves to demonstrate that they cannot possibly satisfy 
the mechanical criteria necessary to make good public policy, especially when compared to a 
legislature that is largely composed of individuals hailing from multivariate vocational 
backgrounds (Hiebert 2012, 97). 
                   
       In directly applying these evaluative criteria to both institutions of policy-making as they 
currently exist in Canada, two things become readily apparent. First, as a matter of normative 
principle, the judiciary is no more qualified than the legislature is to make policy; the inverse holds 
to be true as well. Secondly, in a practical sense, it is ignorant to assume that a small panel of 
judges can realistically possess the vast amounts of knowledge which are necessary to produce 
good public policy. Having arrived at such a conclusion, it must be considered whether or not an 
alternative system would engender better public policy. With respect to what has here been written 
of, a coordinate (or cooperative) model between the judiciary and the legislature(s) appears to be 
the most beneficial (Hiebert 2004, 1966). 
  
       Where a coordinate model is meant to be a system wherein judges retain their ability to review 
policy, but do so with respect to the legislatures’ own interpretations, it proves superior to simple 
judicial supremacy (Hiebert 2004, 1967). Such a model proves favorable due to it necessitating 
that all policy be interpreted in light of the Charter before being passed; it no longer remains 
sufficient to view such action as being the sole venture of the courts (Hiebert 2012, 98). Perhaps 
most importantly, it addresses a significant discrepancy of value in the current model, being that 
legislators are currently viewed as being responsible for creating policy, whereas judges are 
viewed as discerning its righteousness (Hiebert 2012, 104). Simply, the proposal of a legislature 
in creating policy is seen as just that; a proposal. As such, the opinions of legislators are largely 
devalued when compared to those of judges, who are often assumed to be the progenitors of 
objectivity itself, and not merely informed opinion (Leishman 2003, 73). Setting the standard that 
the judiciary is to defer to the legislature(s) where appropriate would do much to remedy this issue, 
and ensure the creation of better public policy (Hiebert 2004, 1972).     
 
       Of course, such a thing is easier said than it is done. If this paper should assert any sort of 
recommendation, it would be that some convention be agreed upon so that a working coordinate 
model may be recognized in Canada; given the variability inherent in matters pertaining more to 
either the courts or the legislatures in capricious contexts, constitutional convention may serve to 
be the best means through which to approach such an issue in the future (Hiebert 2004, 1976). As 
has been expressed throughout this piece, courts alone do not make for peerless policy-makers; 
but in tandem with a mutually respected legislature, policy is bound to be crafted and honed with 
more care than if either institution were to be solely responsible for its formation at the expense of 
the other.  
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